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We use a unique dataset of German banks’ exposure to interest rate risk to derive the
following statements about their exposure to this risk and their earnings from term trans-
formation. The systematic factor for the exposure to interest rate risk moves in sync
with the shape of the term structure. At bank level, however, the time variation of the
exposure is largely determined by idiosyncratic eﬀects. Over time, changes in earnings
from term transformation have a large impact on interest income. Across banks, however,
the earnings from term transformation do not seem to be a decisive factor for the interest
margin.
Keywords: Interest rate risk; term transformation; interest income
JEL classiﬁcation: G11, G21Non-technical summary
Normally, banks extend long-term loans and collect short-term deposits. This mismatch
between the maturities of the assets and liabilities exposes the banks to interest rate risk.
However, this maturity mismatch can also be a source of income (called the earnings from
term transformation) because long-term interest rates tend to be higher than short-term
interest rates.
In this paper, we investigate the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk as well as their earn-
ings from term transformation using a dataset on German banks’ exposure to interest rate
risk; the exposures in this dataset were derived from the banks’ own internal risk models.
The results of our empirical study can be summarized in four statements. (i) For the sam-
ple period September 2005 to December 2009, the systematic factor for the exposure to
interest rate risk rises and falls in sync with the shape of the term structure. (ii) At bank
level, however, the time variation of the exposure is largely determined by idiosyncratic
eﬀects (83%). The systematic factor and regulation, i.e. the quantitative limitation of
interest rate risk in the Pillar 2 of Basel II, account for 9% and 8%, respectively. (iii) In
the period 2005-2009, the earnings from term transformation were estimated at 26.3 basis
points in relation to total assets for the median bank; this accounts for roughly 12.3%
of the interest margin. However, we see large diﬀerences over time and across banking
groups. For instance, the proportion of the earnings from term transformation relative to
the interest margin ranges from 4.6% (in 2008) to 24.3% (in 2009). (iv) For savings and
cooperative banks, changes in earnings from term transformation over time have a large
impact on the interest margin. Across banks, however, exposure to interest rate risk does
not seem to be a decisive factor for the interest margin.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
¨ Ublicherweise vergeben Banken langfristige Kredite und reﬁnanzieren sich durch kurzfristige
Kundeneinlagen. Diese Unterschiede zwischen den Laufzeiten auf der Aktiv- und der
Passivseite f¨ uhren dazu, dass die Banken Zins¨ anderungsrisiken ausgesetzt sind. Diese
Laufzeitunterschiede k¨ onnen jedoch auch eine Einkommensquelle sein (so genannter Struk-
turbeitrag), weil gew¨ ohnlich die langfristigen Zinsen h¨ oher sind als die kurzfristigen Zinsen.
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir beides, das Zins¨ anderungsrisiko der Banken und deren
Strukturbeitrag, d.h. deren Ertr¨ age aus der Fristentransformation. Wir verwenden dazu
einen Datensatz in Bezug auf das Zins¨ anderungsrisiko der Banken in Deutschland, wobei
die Daten aus den bankinternen Risikomodellen stammen. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen
Untersuchung k¨ onnen in vier Kernaussagen zusammengefasst werden: 1. Der system-
atische Faktor f¨ ur die H¨ ohe des Zins¨ anderungsrisikos bewegt sich im Einklang mit der
Zinsstrukturkurve. 2. Auf der Ebene der Einzelbank wird die zeitliche ¨ Anderung des
Zins¨ anderungsrisikos aber weitgehend durch bankspeziﬁsche Eﬀekte bestimmt (83%). Der
systematische Faktor und die Regulierung, d.h. die quantitative Beschr¨ ankung des Zins¨ an-
derungsrisikos in S¨ aule 2 von Basel II, sind f¨ ur 9% und 8% der Variation verantwortlich.
F¨ ur die Medianbank ergibt sich in der Periode von 2005 bis 2009 f¨ ur den Strukturbeitrag
ein Sch¨ atzwert von 26,3 Basispunkten bezogen auf die Bilanzsumme. Dies entspricht
ungef¨ ahr 12,3% der Zinsmarge. Wir sehen jedoch große Unterschiede in den einzelnen
Jahren und zwischen den Bankengruppen. Beispielsweise reicht der Anteil des Struk-
turbeitrags an der Zinsmarge von 4,6% (im Jahr 2008) bis zu 24,3% (im Jahr 2009). 4.
F¨ ur Sparkassen und Kreditgenossenschaften gilt: Zeitliche ¨ Anderungen im Strukturbeitrag
haben große Auswirkungen auf die Zinsmarge. Im Querschnitt der Banken scheint jedoch
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1 Introduction
For many banks, term transformation represents a substantial part of their interest income.
This is especially true of small and medium-sized banks which are engaged in traditional
commercial banking, i.e. granting long-term loans and collecting short-term deposits.
It is important to understand the opportunities and risks related to term transforma-
tion. Supervisors are especially concerned about banks’ interest rate risk. From a ﬁnancial
stability point of view, they have to know what determines changes in banks’ exposure
to interest rate risk and whether the interest rate regulation has an impact on banks’
behavior. By contrast, practitioners are more interested in the earning opportunities from
term transformation. Both issues are addressed in this paper, and four questions guide our
analysis: (i) Is there a relation between the systematic factor of the exposure to interest
rate risk and the shape of the term structure? (ii) What factors determine (at bank level)
the exposure to interest rate risk? (iii) How proﬁtable is term transformation? (iv) Do
banks with a large exposure to interest rate risk have a high interest margin?
The main contribution to the literature is to investigate the four questions from above
with a unique dataset. This dataset includes the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk,
derived from their own internal models. In the previous literature, there are two methods
of assessing the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk: (i) One can use stock market data
and analyze to what extent changes in the shape of the term structure aﬀect the market
value of the banks and (ii) one can estimate the interest rate risk exposure from the banks’
balance sheets. Both methods are fraught with problems, because both methods provide
only an approximation of the banks’ true exposure to interest rate risk.
By contrast, we have data on banks’ exposure to interest rate risk at our disposal and,
therefore, need not rely on estimates. The data covers the period from September 2005
1We thank the discussant and participants at the 13th conference of the Swiss Society for Financial
Market Research (2010) and the participants at the Bundesbank’s Research Seminar. The opinions ex-
pressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the opinions of the Deutsche
Bundesbank.
1to December 2009. With regard to term transformation, this period was very eventful:
From 2005 to summer 2008, the term structure became more and more unadvantageous to
term transformation; in summer 2008, the term structure even became nearly ﬂat. Then,
after the Lehman failure and the subsequent rapid reduction of short-term lending rates
by the central banks, the steepness of the term structure increased considerably. From a
supervisory point of view, this period was eventful, because the regulation for the interest
rate risk in the banking book was introduced (which had previously not been regulated
quantitatively).
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we give a short overview of the
literature in this ﬁeld. Section 3 describes the methods. In Section 4, the dataset is
presented. The results are given in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature of the banks’ interest rate risk (See
Staikouras (2003) and Staikouras (2006) for a survey). The ﬁrst one is about the deter-
minants of the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk, and the second one deals with the
relationship of the interest margin and the possible earnings from term transformation.
Fraser et al. (2002) for the U.S., Ballester et al. (2009) for Spain and Entrop et al. (2008)
for Germany investigate the determinants of the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk. They
ﬁnd that the belonging to certain banking groups, the banks’ size, their earnings and
balance composition, and the banks’ application of derivatives have a signiﬁcant impact
on their exposure to interest rate risk. In this paper, however, we are not interested in
the banks’ level of interest rate exposure, but in the timely changes in the exposure.
English (2002) analyses the relationship of the (net) interest margin and the shape of
the term structure. Using aggregate data for a cross section of countries, he ﬁnds little
evidence that the possible earnings from term transformation (i.e. the slope of the term
structure) have an impact on the interest margin. To some extent, our paper is related
to Czaja et al. (2010). The authors extract the earnings from term transformation out of
stock returns by analyzing a benchmark bond portfolio with the same exposure to interest
rate risk as the underlying stocks. They ﬁnd that a substantial part of the stock returns is
due to term transformation. In our paper, we also choose a benchmark portfolio to infer
a bank’s earnings from term transformation.
2As stated above, we can use data on the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk, derived
from the banks’ internal models, and, therefore, do not have to estimate it. There is a
large body of literature that deals with just this question, i.e. the question of how to
estimate a bank’s exposure to interest rate risk. Often banks’ balance sheets are used,
which are broken down into positions of relatively homogeneous repricing periods. For
each position, a measure of interest rate sensitivity is assigned, for instance, the duration,
and the weighted sum of the positions’ duration is a measure of the bank’s exposure to
interest rate risk (See, for instance, Sierra and Yeager (2004)). The main problem of these
approaches is that they yield a rather imprecise estimate of a bank’s actual exposure,
because the data from the balance sheet is often not detailed enough and oﬀ-balance
sheet positions, especially interest rate swaps, are ignored. Entrop et al. (2008) use time
series of balance sheet data and even their measure can only explain about 27% of the
cross-sectional variation in the actual interest rate exposure of a sample of more than
1,000 German banks. Another method consists in inferring the banks’ interest rate risk
exposure from the banks’ stock returns (See Yourougou (1990) and Fraser et al. (2002)).
This approach, however, is only applicable to the listed banks and not to the unlisted
ones, which account for the vast majority of banks in most countries.
3 Methods
3.1 Exposure in the course of time
As mentioned above, we do not need to estimate the banks’ interest rate exposure from
stock market returns or from balance sheet data, and yet the data analysis poses econo-
metric challenges. The challenges arise owing to the characteristics of the dataset: The
panel is highly unbalanced. On average, there is around one observation for each bank in
each year, but the time diﬀerence between two observations diﬀers widely, from one month
to more than three years. The number of observations per bank is also widely diﬀerent in
the cross section of banks.
The variable Xi(t) with i =1 ,...,N and t =1 ,...,T denotes the exposure to interest












3where αi is a time-invariant, bank-speciﬁc variable that captures the bank’s attitude to-
wards interest rate risk, for instance the banks’ business model, its belonging to a speciﬁc
banking sector and its economic environment. The variable μ(t) describes the general
macroeconomic conditions in month t, in our case especially the shape of the (past and
current) term structure of interest rates. We call this variable the change in the systematic
factor of the exposure to interest rate risk. The variables μ(1),...,μ(T) are cross section-
ally constant. outi(t) is a dummy variable that takes on the value one in month t, if there
exists an exposure observation for bank i in this month and if this exposure is greater than
the regulatory threshold of 0.2. εi(t) is the banks’ idiosyncratic change in the exposure to
interest rate risk. It is assumed to be serially and cross-sectionally independent.
Our aim is to extract the systematic component μ(t) with t =1 ,..,T from the exposure
data (See Equation (1)). One straightforward method is to calculate the change in the
cross-sectional average exposure X(t) in month t (or the cross-sectional average exposure in
a given quarter). The problem with this approach is that the dataset is highly unbalanced,
i.e. not only does the number of banks for which there exist exposure data in a given month
vary, the composition of the sample in a given month may also change systematically. For
instance, it may be the case that there is a cluster of observations of banks with large
exposure to interest rate risk in certain months. To show the problem with this approach,
we write the change in the average cross sectional exposure as
ΔX(t)=X(t) − X(t − 1)
=( α(t) − α(t − 1)) + μ(t)+
 
out(t) − out(t − 1)
 
+( ν(t) − ν(t − 1)), (2)
where α(t) is the cross-sectional average of the bank-speciﬁc variable αi of those banks for
which there is an observation in month t. As the composition of this sample changes in the
course of time, the cross-sectional average α(t) of the time-invariant bank-speciﬁc eﬀects αi
diﬀers from month to month. out(t) is the share of those banks for which there exist data
in month t and whose previous exposure was in excess of the regulatory threshold. ν(t)
is the average cross-sectional idiosyncratic change in the banks’ exposure to interest rate
risk for the banks for which there is an observation in month t. The average idiosyncratic
change can be expected to cancel out in the event that the cross section is suﬃciently
large.
When investigating the changes in the average exposure (as described above), it re-
mains unclear whether a change in the observed average exposure ΔX(t) is due to changes
4in the systematic component of the exposure to interest rate risk μ(t) or whether the com-
position of banks in the sample (α(t) − α(t − 1)) has changed, or whether changes in the
supervisory pressure
 
out(t) − out(t − 1)
 
are responsible.
We choose the following method of mitigating the problem of changing sample com-
position: Instead of the exposure levels Xi(t), we investigate the change in the exposure
of the same bank, as stated in Equation (3). Let Ti(j) with j =1 ,...,ni denote the jth
observation for bank i. ni is the number of exposure observations for bank i. We deﬁne
Ci(j): =Xi(Ti(j)) − Xi(Ti(j − 1)) j =2 ,...,n i (3)
as the change in bank’s exposure, and
Di(j)=Ti(j) − Ti(j − 1) j =2 ,...,n i (4)
as the time span during which this change occurs. Analysing the changes instead of the
levels is accompanied by a loss of information; for instance, we can use only those banks
for which there are at least two observations, i.e. ni ≥ 2.
To illustrate the notation, we give the following example. The interest rate risk expo-
sure of Bank i = 107 be 0.11 in October 2006 (j = 1) and 0.07 in March 2007 (j = 2).
The date is given in months since September 2005, i.e. October 2006 corresponds to
T107(1) = 13 and March 2007 is T107(2) = 18. According to Equation (3), the change
in exposure is C107(2) = −0.04, the time span during which this change occurred is
D107(2) = 5 months (See Equation (4)).










The variable Ci(j) does not depend on the unobservable bank-speciﬁc eﬀect αi and the
coeﬃcients μ(t) with t =1 ,...,T and δ can be estimated with an OLS regression. To see
this, we rewrite Equation (5) as






1 Ti(j − 1) <t≤ Ti(j)
0 otherwise
(8)
where j =2 ,...,n i and i =1 ,...,N. Note that, by assumption, the monthly idiosyncratic
changes εi(t) and thereby the idiosyncratic changes ηi(j) themselves are cross-sectionally
independent. In addition, the idiosyncratic changes ηi(j) are also serially independent,
because, by construction, the changes in exposure refer to non-overlapping periods, i.e.
the monthly idiosyncratic change εi(t) (for a given month t) appears exactly once in
the idiosyncratic change ηi(j) (in the event that Ti(j − 1) <t≤ Ti(j)). However, the
variance of ηi(j) would not be constant even if the monthly idiosyncratic changes εi(t) were
homoskedastic. Even under this assumption, the variance of ηi(j) would not be constant,
but proportional to the time span Di(j) between the current and the previous observation.
To account for this heteroskedasticity, we use White-corrected standard errors. The total




ni − N. (9)
The approach above is comparable to a panel estimation with ﬁxed eﬀects: in both ap-
proaches, the bank-speciﬁc eﬀect is removed by ﬁrst diﬀerences (or, equivalently, by sub-
tracting the time series average). In addition, this approach makes it possible to deal with
a highly unbalanced panel.
3.2 Earnings from term transformation
We cannot directly observe which part of the banks’ interest income is due to term trans-
formation. Therefore, we use an indirect method and we estimate the bank’s earnings
from term transformation by analyzing a bond portfolio which has the same exposure to
interest rate risk as the bank under consideration. We assume that the same exposure to
interest rate risk yields the same earnings from term transformation. If this assumption
holds and if the bank’s exposure to interest rate risk is known (as in our case), we are able
to obtain a precise estimate of the bank’s earnings from term transformation.
The bond portfolio above is based on an investment strategy that consists of revolvingly
investing in ten-year par-yield bonds and of revolvingly selling par-yield bonds with one
year of maturity.2 The basis point value (BPV) of this strategy is around BPVS =0 .372
2See Memmel (2008) for details of these investment strategies.





where Ei(t) is the regulatory capital (own funds) of bank i in month t, and Xi(t) is, as
deﬁned above, the exposure to interest rate risk. Note that Xi(t) is the loss in present
value due to a parallel upward shift of 130 basis points in the term structure in relation to
the bank’s own funds Ei(t) (which explains the multiplication with Ei(t) and the division
by 130).
The variable ki(t) states the ratio of the bank’s interest rate exposure to the interest





If the same exposure to interest rate risk translates into the same earnings from term
transformation, the scaling factor ki(t) concerning the exposure should also apply to the





where Fi(t) and FS(t) are the earnings from term transformation of bank i and of the bond
portfolio, respectively. Combining (11) and (12), we see that a bank’s earnings from term
transformation depend multiplicationally on two factors: the bank’s exposure to interest
rate risk Xi(t) and the market conditions FS(t).
We are not primarily interested in the absolute earnings from term transformation,
but in their relation to total assets TAi(t)( Margin from term transformation variable:
TMi(t)) and the bank’s interest income Ri(t) (variable: sharei(t)). Note that total assets
TAi(t) and interest income Rt(t) are reported only once a year (and, in the case of the











t =3 , 15, 27, 39, 51 (14)
where the points in time correspond to the year-ends of 2005 to 2009.
For this analysis, the assumption Same interest rate risk, same earnings from term
transformation is crucial. To our mind, this assumption can be justiﬁed because interest
7rates of diﬀerent maturities are highly correlated. With respect to, for instance, the stock
market, we would feel less comfortable if we made such an assumption.
Next, we deﬁne the interest margin IMi(t) as (net) interest income over total assets
and we estimate the following panel model:
IMi(t)=αi + βT M i(t)+νi(t) t =3 , 15, 27, 39, 51 (15)
Note that this panel does not suﬀer so much from gaps in the data, because we are now
looking at yearly data (instead of monthly data as in the analyses before). Consequently,
the Δ−operator means the diﬀerence to the previous year, i.e. a lag of 12 months.
We estimate Equation (15) twice, once as a ﬁxed eﬀects model and once as a between-
group model. The ﬁxed eﬀect model
ΔIMi(t)=αw + βwΔTMi(t)+Δ νi(t) t =1 5 , 27, 39, 51 (16)
gives information on how changes in a bank’s earnings from term transformation aﬀect
the bank’s interest margin. If changes in the earnings from term transformation do not
aﬀect other components of the interest income, we expect the coeﬃcient βw to equal one.
By contrast, the between group model
IMi = αb + βb TMi + νi (17)
gives evidence as to whether banks with higher interest rate risk exposure tend to have
higher interest margins. If βb equals one, earnings from term transformation are an ad-
ditional source of interest income (which do not compete with other income sources for
limited risk budgets). This assumption is not so farfetched as it seems, because interest
rate risk in the banking book need not be backed with regulatory capital. By contrast, if
the coeﬃcient βb is zero, then term transformation competes with other income sources
for limited internal risk budgets. If term transformation is more proﬁtable (in terms of
units of risk budget) than the competing sources of interest income, we will expect βb in
the interval between zero and one.
4 Data
According to section 24 of the Banking Act, banks in Germany must immediately notify
BaFin and the Bundesbank if their banking book losses exceed 20% of their own funds
8owing to a standardized interest rate shock. The ratio of losses in present value over
own funds is called Basel interest rate coeﬃcient. To be able to fulﬁll the notiﬁcation
requirement, banks have to calculate at regular intervals how much the present value of
their banking book goes down owing to this standardized interest rate shock. Currently,
the standardized interest rate shock consists of two parts: a parallel upward shift of 130
basis points (bp) in the entire term structure and a parallel downward shift of 190 basis
points. The relevant shock for the banks is the one which leads to the larger losses.
Nearly all of the banks will gain if the term structure shifts downward and lose if the
term structure moves upward, because banks tend to grant long-term loans and take in
short-term deposits. For the few banks for which the 190-bp-upward shift is the relevant
shock we proceed as follows: Their exposure is multiplied by -130/190 to account for their
negative term transformation and to rescale their exposure. Observations of parallel shifts
of other than 130 basis points are rescaled accordingly. When calculating the eﬀects of
the interest rate shock, banks have to include all on-balance and all oﬀ-balance positions
in their banking book.
Our dataset concerning the Basel interest rate coeﬃcient consists of two sources: the
notiﬁcations in the event that the losses exceed 20% of the own funds, and the information
gathered in regular on-site inspections. Our data cover the period from September 2005 to
December 2009. In Table 1, we report summary statistics of the banks’ change in exposure
to interest rate risk Ci(j), the time between two observations Di(j), and the number
of observations per bank ni. For conﬁdentiality reasons, we cannot report descriptive
statistics about the exposure Xi(t) itself or the regulatory dummy outi(t). The dataset
consists of 4,014 observations of changes in the interest rate risk exposure. On average,
the change in the Basel interest rate coeﬃcient is close to zero. The 25 percent largest
change is 3.02 percentage points, the 25 percent lowest change is -2.42 percentage points.
The time between two observations is, on average, 14 months, i.e. on average, there is
one observation for 13 gaps. The sample covers 1,562 banks, i.e. for these banks, there
are at least two observations available (ni ≥ 2). Given a bank is in the sample, there
are, on average, about 3.5 exposure observations (and one observation fewer when we
refer to observations of changes in the exposure). The sample is biased towards the small
and medium-sized savings and cooperative banks. In December 2009, savings banks and
cooperative banks accounted for 22.2% and 59.7% of all banks in Germany, respectively.
For the variable change in the interest rate exposure Ci(j) in our sample, the respective
9ﬁgures are 28.5% and 67.8%.
As outlined above, we analyze a passive investment strategy for government bonds.
The government bond yields are taken from Deutsche Bundesbank which uses the Svens-
son (1994) approach to estimate the term structure from government bonds (See Schich
(1997)). Data concerning the banks’ balance sheets, their interest income and their own
funds is taken from Bundesbank’s database BAKIS (See Memmel and Stein (2008) for de-
tails). Table 1 also gives the information on the interest margin in the period 2005-2009.
On average, this margin is around 225 basis points in relation to total assets.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Exposure to interest rate risk
As described in Subsection 3.1, we run the regression (5) to estimate changes in the
systematic component of the exposure to interest rate risk μ(1),...,μ(T). As stated above,
to account for possible deviations from the OLS assumptions concerning the covariance
matrix of the residuals, we make use of the heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix
estimation according to White (1980). In addition to the variable outi(t), which measures
supervisory pressure as a dummy variable for banks exceeding the regulatory threshold, we
introduce another variables for the regulation: the dummy variable out2i(t) which takes
on the value one in the event that a bank is far above the regulatory threshold, i.e. that
the banks’ Basel interest rate coeﬃcient is larger than 0.3.
In Table 2, we report the regression results. Owing to lack of space, the 51 coeﬃcients
μ(1),...,μ(51) are not reported in this table, but graphically displayed in Figure 1. In
this ﬁgure, the cumulative estimated change is plotted, i.e. SC(T)=
 T
t=1 μ(t). Up until
late summer 2008, we see a declining trend in the systematic factor. From autumn 2008
onwards, the systematic factor rises steeply. For comparison purposes, we also plot the
earnings of the benchmark bond portfolio. Qualitatively, both variables show the same
pattern. This ﬁnding gives evidence that the systematic factor of changes in the exposure
to interest rate risk is closely related to the (past and present) steepness of the term
structure.
The results shown in Table 2 make it possible to gauge the impact of diﬀerent factors,
at bank level, on the exposure to interest rate risk. Above, we investigated the system-
10atic factor that drives the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk, i.e. μ(t). Now, we are
investigating, at bank level, how far the systematic factor, regulation and idiosyncratic
eﬀects impact the exposure to interest rate risk. As before, we measure the systematic
factor with the coeﬃcients μ(t), the regulatory pressure with outi(t) and out2i(t), and
the idiosyncratic factor with ηi(j). By analysing the coeﬃcient of determination R2 in
diﬀerent speciﬁcations, it is possible to assess the contribution of the diﬀerent variables.
In Table 2, we show the coeﬃcient of determination for diﬀerent regression models:
the full model (column 2), the model without the regulation variables (column 3) and
the model with only the regulation variables (column 4). The R2 of the full model is
17.24%, i.e. the combined contribution of the systematic factor and the regulation to the
total timely variation of the exposure is 17.24% and, therefore, 82.76% of the variation is
due to idiosyncratic eﬀects. These eﬀects may be changes in the bank’s business model,
speculation about abrupt changes in the interest rates, and changes in the bank’s own
funds. Note that we consider the exposure relative to the bank’s own fund. That is why
the relative exposure changes in the event that the absolute exposure remains constant
and the own funds decrease or increase.
With the help of the two other speciﬁcations, it is possible to disentangle the contri-
butions of the systematic factor and of the regulation. One can expect some correlation
between the regulatory variables outi(t)a n dout2i(t) on the one hand, and the variables
ei(t) on the other: In the event that the bank’s exposure is above the supervisory thresh-
old, it can be expected that there will be more observations (because, in this case, the
bank is likely to report its interest rate exposure to the supervisor more frequently). In
fact, it turns out that the sum of the R2s of the two incomplete models is slightly larger
than the R2 of the full model, i.e. 10.08% + 8.63% > 17.24%. To sum up the shares of
explained variation to 0.1724, we scale them. The share of explained variation due to the
systematic factor is 9.29% (= 10.08% x 17.24/(10.08+8.63)), the share due to regulation
is 7.95%.
When extracting the systematic factor for the exposure to interest rate risk, we see a
strong co-movement. But, when we look at the bank level, the systematic factor accounts
for a bit more than 9% of the timely variation in the interest rate risk exposure. Regulation
accounts for slightly less than 8% of the timely variation. Banks with exposure above the
regulatory threshold of 20% reduce their exposure on average by 3.31 percentage points
11between two reports. If the exposure is above 30%, the reduction is even higher and
amounts to 7.96 (=3.31+4.65) percentage points.
5.2 Earnings from term transformation
To calculate the earnings from term transformation as outlined in Subsection 3.2, we need
the information on the banks’ exposure Xi(t) in each month t. However, the dataset
includes around 13 gaps for each observation. We determine intermediate gaps by linear
interpolation. Gaps at the beginning and at the end are ﬁlled in with the bank’s ﬁrst and
last exposure, respectively.
In Table 3, we show the banks’ estimated earnings from term transformation normal-
ized to total assets (the ratio TMi(t) as deﬁned in Equation (13)). We give the results for
the median bank and we break down the results into banking groups and years.
Over the whole period 2005-2009 and over all banking groups, the median bank earned
26.3 basis points (in relation to total assets and per annum). There are, however, large
diﬀerences across the years and across the banking groups. In 2005, when term transfor-
mation was quite proﬁtable, the median bank earned more than 56 basis points from term
transformation, whereas in 2008, when the term structure was nearly ﬂat, the median
bank earned barely more than nine basis points. The results illustrate that earnings from
term transformation are quite volatile in the course of time, depending on the current and
past shape of the term structure.
Savings banks and cooperative banks are said to rely heavily on earnings from term
transformation. And, in fact, the earnings from term transformation for the median
savings bank (29.2 bp) and for the median cooperative bank (30.2 bp) are much higher
than the ones for the median private commercial bank (6.9 bp) and for the median other
bank (6.8 bp). This reliance on term transformation among savings banks and cooperative
banks can be also seen when we look at the share of earnings from term transformation
in relation to interest income (See Table 4). For the median savings bank and cooperative
bank, this share is around 15% and 13%, respectively, for the median private commercial
bank it amounts to less than 5%.
These results are consistent with earlier ﬁndings for the German banking sector. En-
trop et al. (2008) ﬁnd that German savings and cooperative banks have a signiﬁcantly
12higher exposure to interest rate risk than other banks, and practitioners gauge that Ger-
man banks earnings from term transformation amount to between 10% and 35% of the
banks interest income.3
In Table 5, we show the results of the panel regression, the ﬁxed eﬀect or within-
model (Equation (16)) and the between-group model (Equation (17)). This table reads
as follows, for instance, for the savings banks: When a savings bank’s earnings from term
transformation increase by 1 basis point (as compared to the previous year), the interest
income (normalized to total assets) goes up by 0.51 basis points. The timely variation of
the earnings from term transformation accounts for 30.48% of the timely variation in the
savings bank’s interest margin. The second row concerns the cross-sectional relationship
between earnings from term transformation and interest margin. If two savings banks
diﬀer by 1 basis point in the time average of the earnings from term transformation, the
time average interest margin is 0.59 basis point higher for the savings bank with the higher
average earnings from term transformation. The results are based on 2,217 observations of
458 savings banks, i.e. for each savings bank, there are on average 4.8 (out of ﬁve possible)
observations.
The results of the within estimation, at least for the savings and cooperative banks
(which account for more than 90% of all observations in our sample), are consistent with
expectations: Although the two βw-coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly smaller than 1 (around
0.5), the interest income of savings and cooperative banks rises and falls in accordance with
the respective earnings from term transformation. The fact that a 1 basis point increase
in the earnings from term transformation does not translate in a 1 basis point increase in
the interest income may be due to a negative correlation between the earnings from term
transformation and the risk premia on loans. In times of a boom the term structure tends
to be steep and the risk premia (and thereby the mark-up) tend to be low. According
to the coeﬃcients of determination R2, the timely variation in the earnings from term
transformation accounts for roughly one-third of the variation in the interest margin (for
savings and cooperative banks).
The results of the between-group model do not indicate that banks with high interest
rate exposure tend to have a high interest margin. It appears that the interest margin
is not much determined by the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk. To be fair, for the
3See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 June 2009.
13savings banks we see a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient, however the explanatory power,
measured by the R2, is relatively low (4.08% compared to the R2 of the corresponding
within- regression of 30.48%), for the other banking groups (apart from the regression
with all banks) we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. One possible explanation of
this ﬁnding is that banks take the interest rate risk into account when they allocate the
budgets to the diﬀerent sorts of risk and that the risk from term transformation yields
approximately the same return as, for instance, credit risk, measured in terms of risk units.
6 Conclusion
Using a unique dataset of German banks’ exposure to interest rate risk, we can address
questions about the banks’ behavior concerning this sort of risk and about their earnings
from term transformation. We see that the systematic factor of the exposure to interest
rate risk indeed moves in accordance with the possible earnings from term transformation.
At bank level, however, bank speciﬁc and regulatory eﬀects are far more important. For
savings and cooperative banks, earnings from term transformation are an important source
of interest income, and timely changes in earnings from term transformation strongly
aﬀect their interest income. However, in the cross-section, the interest margin is not much
determined by the exposure to interest rate risk.
The results apply especially to the small and medium-sized banks in the German
savings and cooperative bank sector, which are engaged in traditional commercial banking.
These results could be transferred to similarly structured banks in other countries.
14Appendix
Considering a ﬂat term structure with continuously compounded interest rate r, a bond
with a residual maturity of M [in years] and a continuously paid coupon c, we can express
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The duration of a strategy that consists in revolvingly investing in par-yield bonds of









M − 1/r (1 − exp(−rM))
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. (22)
We investigate two durations, M = 1 year and M = 10 years. For M = 1 year, we set
r =4 .42% p.a., for M = 10 years, we set r =5 .40% p.a.4 The corresponding average
modiﬁed durations are Dmod( 1 )=0 .4927 and Dmod(10) = 4.2093, respectively. The basis
point value (BVP) of a strategy that is long in the 10-year bonds and short in the 1-year








=0 .1(4.2093 − 0.4927) = 0.3716 (24)
4For the period 1990-2008, the average one-year and ten-year interest rates were 4.52% and 5.55%,
respectively. To calculate the durations, we use the corresponding continuously compounded interest
rates.
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17Tables and Figures
Variable Nobs Mean p25 p50 p75
Change in exposure Ci(j)[ × 100] 4014 0.19 -2.42 0.24 3.02
Time between two obs. Di(j) [months] 4014 14.25 10 12 17
Number of obs. per bank ni 1562 3.57 3 3 4
Interest margin [basis points] 8816 224 192 226 256





















































































































Figure 1: Systematic factor of the exposure to interest rate risk, derived from time dum-
mies as explained in Table 2 (smoothed by moving averages) (right axis); earnings (in %
p.a.) from term transformation of the benchmark bond portfolio (left axis)
18Variable Dep. var. Ci(j)
μ(1)






const. 0.0097*** -0.0030 0.0085***
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0007)
R2 0.1724 0.1008 0.0863
Nobs 4014 4014 4014
Table 2: Dependent variable: change in the exposure to interest rate risk Ci(j). Regres-
sors: time dummies μ(1),...,μ(51), dummies outi(t)( out2i(t)) for banks with exposure
(signiﬁcantly) above the regulatory threshold; White (1980)-adjusted standard errors in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively.
Banking group 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005-2009
Private com. banks 20.2 12.6 3.7 2.6 16.2 6.9
Savings banks 54.2 36.2 11.6 8.5 51.8 29.2
Cooperative banks 61.0 40.8 13.3 10.1 59.4 30.2
Other banks 16.8 11.6 3.5 2.2 11.9 6.8
All banks 56.1 37.7 12.3 9.2 54.9 26.3
Table 3: Earnings from term transformation over total assets [basis points and per annum]
(TMi(t)); median bank
19Banking group 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005-2009
Private com. banks 11.2% 6.2% 1.8% 1.4% 8.7% 4.6%
Savings banks 25.8% 18.2% 6.5% 4.8% 24.9% 14.6%
Cooperative banks 23.5% 16.8% 5.9% 4.7% 24.8% 12.7%
Other banks 21.3% 15.4% 5.6% 2.9% 13.5% 8.7%
All banks 23.8% 16.9% 5.9% 4.6% 24.3% 12.3%
Table 4: Earnings from term transformation over interest income [per annum](sharei(t));
median bank
Banking group Model Coeﬀ. β Stand. Dev. R2 Obs. / banks
Private com. banks Within -0.01 0.10 0.0000 395
Between 0.30 0.74 0.0020 85
Savings banks Within 0.51*** 0.02 0.3048 2217
Between 0.59*** 0.13 0.0408 458
Cooperative banks Within 0.54*** 0.01 0.3601 5859
Between 0.14 0.09 0.0018 1217
Other banks Within -0.17 0.18 0.0072 342
Between -0.01 1.12 0.0000 72
All banks Within 0.48*** 0.01 0.2205 8816
Between 0.52*** 0.12 0.0107 1834
Table 5: Results for the regression: IMi(t)=αi + βT M i(t)+νi(t), where IMi(t)i st h e
interest margin and TMi(t) are earnings (over total assets) from term transformation of
bank i in t. Only the coeﬃcient β is given. Yearly data from 2005 to 2009. Within is the
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation, between is the between-group estimation. ***, ** and * denote
signiﬁcance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively.
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